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Abstract— An investigation was performed to study the potential 
for radio frequency (RF) power radiated from transmitting 
Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs) to create an arcing/sparking 
event within the fuel tank of a large transport aircraft.  A survey 
of RF emissions from typical intentional transmitting PEDs was 
first performed.  Aircraft measurements of RF coupling to the 
fuel tank and its wiring were also performed to determine the 
PEDs induced power on the wiring, and the re-radiated power 
within the fuel tank.  Laboratory simulations were conducted to 
determine the required RF power level for an arcing/sparking 
event.  Data analysis shows large positive safety margins, even 
with simulated faults on the wiring. 
Keywords- TWA-800, Aircraft Accident Investigation, Portable 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 1996, the Trans World Airlines Flight 800 
(TWA-800) Boeing 747 Series 100 (B747-100) aircraft 
exploded and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.  The flight had 
departed 14 minutes earlier, traveling from New York’s John F.  
Kennedy airport to Paris.  To date, it is believed that a fuel 
vapor ignition occurred in the center-wing-tank (CWT).  The 
cause of the ignition is still unresolved. 
Approximately two years later, a special supplement was 
published in The New York Review of Books entitled “The 
Fall of TWA 800: The possibility of Electromagnetic 
Interference” [1].  It was a claim in this report that external RF 
threats, many from Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) high 
power sources on nearby ships, aircraft, and the ground 
contributed to the cause of the arcing event within the fuel tank.  
The report, along with several following papers from the same 
author, prefaced the desire to quantify the threat from the 
external high intensity radiated field (HIRF). 
As a result, the DoD Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) was 
contracted by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) to perform a detailed analysis of the TWA-800 
electromagnetic environment [2].  The JSC reported that all 
dominant, external RF emitters were pulsed sources, with peak 
field intensities of up to 32.6 V/m at the time and the location 
of the TWA-800 event.  NASA Langley Research Center 
(LaRC) was asked to determine if the environment could 
induce sufficient energy to create arcing/sparking or excessive 
heating on the wiring or in the fuel tank.  The analysis was 
performed through numerical calculations analysis, and the 
results were reported in a different paper [3]. 
At the same time, NASA LaRC was also asked to 
determine if internal RF sources can be of concern.  It can be 
demonstrated that a portable radio transmitting 5W may 
generate field levels in excess of 100 V/m close to its antenna.  
Inside an aircraft, these portable electronic devices (PEDs) can 
be placed within inches of the fuel quantity indication system 
(FQIS) wiring.  Therefore, they can be considered a greater 
threat as their emissions are not subject to airframe shielding as 
are outside HIRF sources. 
Internal PEDs sources include intentionally transmitting 
PEDs, such as wireless phones and two-way radios, and 
unintentionally transmitting devices such as laptop computers 
and game devices.  In terms of radiated power, intentionally 
transmitting PEDs are much more likely to be a threat since 
many of them may radiate as high as 6 watts.  Unintentionally 
transmitting devices radiate at levels below intentional 
radiators, even when damaged, and are not considered as a 
threat in this case. 
This paper details the measurement, analysis and laboratory 
demonstration to determine the risk of transmitting PEDs to the 
fuel tank and its wiring, and whether there was sufficient 
energy in the arc/spark to be of concerns.  Fig. 1 illustrates the 
external and internal potential RF threats.  Only internal threats 
are considered in this paper. 
II. APPROACH 
PED and their RF emission envelopes were first identified.  
RF coupling measurements between the passenger cabin and 
the fuel tank and its CWT wiring were then performed on a 
retired Boeing 747 aircraft of the same production series.  
Together, these data provide an upper bound on the maximum 
RF threats to the fuel tank.  Laboratory testing was also 
conducted to determine the power requirement for an arc/spark 
on the FQIS wiring.  The safety margin was determined from 
the measured data. 
In the laboratory testing, a fault was simulated on a set of 
FQIS wiring at the location determined to have the highest 
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voltage/current gain.  This simulation emulated the severe 
conditions that include damaged wiring, or floating conducting 
debris in the tank that may short circuit the terminals. 
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Figure 1.  External and internal RF threats to a B747 fuel tank and its wiring. 
III. ESTIMATING TYPICAL PED THREATS 
PED threats considered were limited to intentionally 
transmitting and commercially available devices at the time of 
the accident.  The threat information was gathered from three 
sources: devices’ manufacturer specifications, FCC limits, and 
ANSI C63.18-1997 for typical transmitters.  The goal was to 
establish a reasonable bound of the RF emissions from typical 
PEDs devices.  A summary of the data is shown in Fig. 2. 
A. Manufacturer Specifications 
Operating frequencies and the maximum radiated power 
were compiled for about 50 devices.  They included portable 
radios, wireless phones, satellite phones, wireless local-area-
network (LAN) devices, and two-way pagers [3]. 
B. Determination of FCC Limits 
FCC limits were of interest since they provided an upper 
bound for commercially available devices.  However, an 
extensive search through the FCC regulations proved tedious.  
As a result, the data shown in Fig. 2 were far from complete, 
and were limited to wireless phones and handheld transceivers. 
C. ANSI C63.18-1997 
This standard [4] recommended a practice for testing 
medical devices to specific RF transmitters.  It also provided a 
good summary of typical transmitting PEDs.  A partial list of 
PEDs is shown in Table 1 and the data plotted in Fig. 2. 
D. Transmitting PEDs Threat Summary 
Fig. 2 shows most devices radiate six watts or less, except 
at 27 MHz and at 900 MHz.  The FCC limit at 27 MHz is 25 W 
for remote radio control, and the ANSI C63.18 standard shows 
10 W maximum for radio modem at 900 MHz. 
Fig. 2 also shows that PEDs frequencies were mostly 
between 25 MHz and 2.6 GHz (1996-1998 time frame).  The 
FCC also allocates spectrum up to about 6 GHz for a few 
applications.  Based on these data, the subsequent aircraft 
coupling measurements were chosen to range between 25 MHz 
and 6 GHz.  Details about the coupling measurements are 
described in the next section. 
TABLE I.  PEDS AND MAXIMUM OUTPUT POWER FROM ANSI C63.18-1997 
Products Frequency (MHz) Power (W) 
Hand-held transceivers 27, 49, 138-470 5 
Wireless LANs 912, 2400 0.1 
Personal digital assistants 896-940 4 
Radio modems 896-901 10 
Cellular Telephones 800-900 0.6 
Personal satellite telephones 1610-1626.5 1 
Licensed PCS equipment 1850-1910 1 
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Figure 2.  PED emission levels. 
IV. RF COUPLING TO FUEL TANK AND WIRING 
There were three assumed paths for coupling RF energy to 
a fault location in the fuel tank: 
• Conducted Coupling:  Once coupled onto the FQIS wiring, 
RF power stayed attached to wiring all the way to the fault 
location to create a spark/arc. 
• Radiated Coupling: 
o Through FQIS Wiring: RF power coupled into the 
CWT through the wiring then re-radiated.  The energy 
then coupled onto the wiring near the fault location. 
o Not through FQIS Wiring:  RF fields coupled into the 
CWT through other means such as pipes and 
unshielded apertures.  The energy then radiated and 
coupled onto the wiring near a fault location to create 
a spark/arc. 
  It was desirable to measure and bound the power coupled 
into the CWT and its wiring of the aircraft.  This was 
performed by measuring the induced power on the FQIS wiring 
at the CWT connector and the radiated power density in the 
CWT.  A log-periodic antenna and a dual-ridge-horn antenna 
were used from 25 MHz to 6 GHz to simulate radiating PED 
sources in the passenger cabin. 
A. Conducted Coupling to CWT on FQIS wiring 
The FQIS wiring provided a conducted coupling path into 
the CWT.  The coupling measurement was performed at the 
FQIS CWT connector, with an antenna in the passenger cabin 
simulating the internal PED sources. 
This work was supported by the National Transportation Safety Board 
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1) Test Method 
Power coupled onto the FQIS was measured at the fuel tank 
connector, shown in Fig. 3.  Due to the limited time available, 
the measurements were performed for only three pin 
combinations that represent both differential and common 
mode couplings:  1) HI Z to LO Z pins, 2) HI Z to LO Z 
COMP, and 3) all pins (HI Z, LO Z and LO Z COMP) tied 
together relative to airframe chassis. 
The set up is shown in Fig. 4.  A spectrum analyzer was 
used to measure the peak coupled power onto the FQIS wiring.  
A tracking sources delivered a fixed RF power level to the 
transmit antenna while performing synchronized frequency 
sweeps with the spectrum analyzer. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the measurement being performed.  The 
transmit antenna was scanning the length of the FQIS wiring 
directly under the floor.  5-10 centimeters spacing was 
maintained.  Measurements were performed for both transmit 
antenna polarizations, parallel and perpendicular to the wiring. 
The transmit antenna was also pointed in several random 
directions for identifying possible other coupling paths than 
through the FQIS wiring.  However, random direction data 
show much lower coupling value in comparison. 
2) Test Results 
Fig. 6 shows the results from the aircraft measurement.  
Data are presented in two plots due to two separate hardware 
set-ups necessary to cover the frequency range of interest. 
Of the three measurements, the All-Pins-to-Chassis 
measurement shows the highest coupling up to about 2 GHz.  
This configuration represents the common mode coupling, as 
oppose to differential mode coupling for the remaining 
measurements.  Above 2 GHz, all three measurements show 
similar coupling envelope. 
It is noted that the transmit antenna was used out-of-band 
below 100 MHz, resulting in high reflected power due to 
antenna mismatch.  To simulate full radiated power, the 
measurement data were numerically scaled using a scale factor 
computed from the antenna’s reflection coefficients.  This 
approach was used in the past with good results [3][5]. 
 
Figure 3.  FQIS CWT Amphenol D3 connector schematic. 
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Figure 4.  RF Coupling to FQIS wiring measurement. 
 
Figure 5.  A log-periodic antenna simulating a portable transmitter  
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Figure 6.  Coupling from passenger cabin to FQIS wiring. 
A variation of this technique was also used to account for 
the impedance mismatch caused by the custom adapter.  This 
custom adapter allowed measurement of power on the FQIS 
wiring using a 50-ohm N connector.  The reflection coefficient 
from the interface was first measured and time-gated using a 
network analyzer.  A simple mathematic manipulation allowed 
the correction factor to be derived.  Without this correction, the 
mismatch errors can be as much as 4 dB at 25 MHz.  Details on 
this correction factor derivation can also be found in [3]. 
B. Radiated Coupling to Antenna inside CWT 
If the wiring is long relative to a wavelength, much of the 
coupled RF power on the FQIS wiring may be radiated.  There 
is a possibility that some of the radiated energy may be coupled 
back onto the FQIS near a fault location.  An arc/spark may 
result if there is sufficient energy.  This section describes the 
measurement of radiated power in the CWT due to PED 
sources in the passenger cabin. 
1) Test Method: 
The measurement approach was similar to that used in 
measuring the coupling onto the FQIS wiring, but with 
antennas to measure the power density in the CWT.  A 
mechanical stirrer was set up in the CWT bays to allow 
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measurements of field statistics, such as the peak power 
density.  The set up is illustrated in Fig. 7. 
Due to time restrictions, radiated field measurements were 
performed in only three of the six bays, labeled as Bays 1, 3 
and 6 in Fig. 8.  The same measurements were also repeated 
with the FQIS connector de-mated from the tank for 
comparison.  A pre-amplifier was necessary above 1 GHz for 
the required instrument sensitivity, especially when the 
connector was de-mated. 
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Figure 7.  Radiated field coupling to CWT 
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Figure 8.  CWT top view representation.  Data collected for Bays 1, 3 and 6. 
The antennas used were expected to be more efficient in 
coupling RF energy than the FQIS wiring.  As a result, the 
measurement provided an upper bound of the power that can be 
re-coupled onto the FQIS wiring or other structures. 
The log-periodic antenna in the CWT was used out-of-band 
below 200 MHz.  Unlike the transmit antenna in the passenger 
cabin, no corrections were applied in this case.  The antennas 
were situated in tight spaces made of conducting surfaces.  The 
cavity effects on antenna mismatch were difficult to quantify.  
It was decided best to present the data without the correction. 
2) Test Results: 
a) With FQIS Connector Mated to the Tank: 
The results are shown in Fig. 9.  The figure shows the 
coupling to Bay 1 (where the FQIS entered the CWT) 
dominates between 500 MHz to 2 GHz, while the coupling to 
Bays 3 and 6 dominated above 3 GHz.  The worst-case 
coupling was at about 500 MHz, with approximately -43 dB 
coupling factor.  This value was about 20 dB lower than the 
worst case coupling onto the FQIS wiring. 
b) With FQIS Connector De-Mated: 
For frequencies below 1.5 GHz, the peak coupling into the 
CWT was lowered by about 10 dB on the average when the 
FQIS connector was de-mated.  This result shows that the FQIS 
wiring was the major contributor to the radiated field 
environment in this frequency range.  Above 1.5 GHz, there 
were no significant differences in the envelopes, whether the 
connector was mated or de-mated.  Further information on this 
result can be found in [3]. 
V. PEDS COUPLED POWER ONTO FQIS WIRING AND 
ANTENNA IN THE CWT 
Application of the PED threat levels in Fig. 2 to the peak 
coupling data envelopes in Fig. 6 and Fig. 9 resulted in Fig. 10 
and Fig. 11, respectively.  Fig. 10 shows the maximum PEDs 
power coupled onto the FQIS wiring, measured at the tank 
entry point.  Fig. 11 shows the maximum power coupled into 
an antenna in the fuel tank, measured in Bays 1, 3 and 6. 
Fig. 11 shows that the peak PEDs power coupled into an 
efficient antenna in the fuel tank (radiated field coupling) is 
approximately 0.2 milliwatt (mW) near 500 MHz.  This result 
bounds the maximum radiated power in the fuel tank that could 
be coupled onto an internal structure or wiring through the 
radiated coupling path.  Laboratory testing indicated that this 
level could not cause an arc/spark, even if there were faults in 
the wiring. 
Fig. 10 shows at least 20 dB more power was measured at 
the FQIS wiring connector, however.  The peak coupled power 
was about 60 mW near 27 MHz, and 20 mW between 100 to 
500 MHz.  
It was also evident from Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 that PEDs 
coupling at frequencies above 1 GHz declines significantly.  
This result was important for determining the upper frequency 
limit for subsequent laboratory testing. 
The next section describes the laboratory testing to 
determine the minimum required power at the connector for an 
arc/spark condition.  The safety margin was then determined 
from the data in Fig. 10 and the laboratory test results. 
VI. ADDITIONAL FUEL TANK MEASUREMENT 
Fuel tank radiated field bay-to-bay coupling measurements 
were also made.  The details are not reported here due to page 
length restrictions, but can be found in [3].  It can be 
summarized that there is strong field coupling between the fuel 
tank bays.  At several frequencies, the coupling between two 
antennas in two adjacent bays was as strong as though the 
antennas were in the same bay.  This result indicates that any 
RF leakage into one bay can result in similar field strength in 
adjacent bays.  The leakage mechanisms were thought to be 
apertures (for fuel transfer), re-radiation via the FQIS wiring 
and conductive pipes.  In these bay-to-bay coupling 
measurements, mechanical stirrers were used in each bays 
similar to the methods described in [6][7]. 
VII. RF SUSCEPTIBILITY LABORATORY TESTING 
The FQIS wiring and the fuel level sensors were 
disassembled from the aircraft fuel tank for laboratory 
installation.  The sensors were mounted on a large aluminum 
panel, with wiring-to-panel spacing similar to actual aircraft 
installation. 
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Figure 9.  Peak coupling to antenna in different CWT bays. 
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Figure 10.  PEDs power coupled onto FQIS wiring. 
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Figure 11.  PEDs power coupled into an antenna in CWT. 
 Measurements were conducted to determine the location 
on the wiring that showed the largest voltage/current coupling 
gain relative to the connector location.  At this location, a 
wiring fault was simulated by intermittently shorting the 
terminal to the chassis (accomplished by with a piece of bronze 
wool blown by modulated air jet).  The fault was to simulate 
conducting debris floating in the fuel tank that could 
intermittently short the terminals.  Without this fault 
simulation, it was not possible to create an arc/spark event with 
the available 40 W RF amplifier.  Fig. 12 shows the simulated 
fault location and the setup.  Fig. 13 illustrates the simulation 
of intermittent fault at the wiring. 
 
Figure 12.  Laboratory set-up for arc/spark tests. 
 
Figure 13.  Air jet, modulated with a fan, causing intermittent short circuit 
between a wire terminal and the chassis. 
A. Arc/Spark Detection 
A critical element in the laboratory simulation is the ability 
to detect an arc/spark.  Several methods were explored, 
including a night-vision scope attached to a consumer-grade 
camcorder, as shown in Fig. 14.  Also considered were a 
nitrogen-cooled thermal imaging system for heat detection, a 
ultraviolet radiation detector with latched-alarm, and an AM 
radio to amplify static noise generated by an arc/spark.  It was 
determined that the night-vision setup provided the best 
detection reliability (high detection rate with low false alarm), 
and was used for subsequent testing.  A thermal imaging 
system was also setup for observation.  However, no excessive 
heating was observed. 
  The arc/spark detection system must be capable of 
detecting an arc/spark having the energy content of about ¼ 
millijoule (mJ) or lower.  Generally, ¼ mJ per spark is an 
industry accepted level below which the energy level is 
insufficient to ignite the fuel vapor [8]. 
The detection system must be calibrated to ensure the 
required sensitivity for avoiding missed detection.  An 
electrostatic-discharge (ESD) gun was used to provide the 
arc/spark energy level for the calibration.  A conservative 
calculation provided the voltage setting on the ESD gun for a ¼ 
mJ maximum discharge. 
The night vision detection system reliably detected the 
arc/spark.  An example image of the arc/spark event at the 
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simulated fault location, and the detected image through a night 
vision system are shown in Fig. 16.  This image was taken 
during an actual test in which RF was injected into the 
connector causing the arc/spark at the simulated fault location. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Night vision spark detection system and a detected spark (image 
reversed as seen through a mirror) 
B. Radiated Field Susceptibility 
As a result of the low coupled power to the receive antenna 
in fuel tank shown in Fig. 11, laboratory testing for radiated 
field susceptibility was very simple.  Using a reverberation 
chamber and performing chamber calibration, the input power 
to the transmit antenna can be easily determined to achieve the 
same peak receive power shown in Fig. 11.  Exposing the rest 
of the FQIS wiring to the same field did not result in 
arcing/sparking.  The system was over-tested slightly up to the 
maximum level provided by a laboratory RF source, and no 
arc/spark was observed.  The system was not tested to failure, 
however. 
C. Conducted Power Susceptibility 
The power determined to exist on the wires from PED 
sources, as shown in Fig. 10, was injected directly on the wires 
at the FQIS connector.  No arcing/sparking events were 
observed during the test.  However, under simulated fault 
conditions and with increased injected power, arcing/ sparking 
events at the fault location were observed. 
In this test, up to 40 watts of RF power were injected onto 
the FQIS wires at the connector, while the simulated fault 
locations were monitored for arcing/sparking events.  The 
required powers for an arc/spark event are shown in Fig. 15.  
Also shown in Fig. 15 are the previously determined maximum 
PEDs power levels at the connector.  Additional details on the 
testing are presented in [3]. 
D. Safety Margin Analysis 
Fig. 15 shows that the power required to create an arc/spark 
far exceeded the worst case PEDs power coupling onto the 
FQIS wiring by a large margin.  Even with a 25 W PED 
transmitter at 27 MHz, the safety margin was about 10 dB.  
This result translates into approximately 250 W of PED power 
to cause an arc/spark, even with faulty wiring.  Between 200 
MHz to 300 MHz, the safety margin was about 18 dB.  Above 
300 MHz, a 40 W amplifier was not able to create an arc/spark. 
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Figure 15.  Adjusted PED threats on FQIS wiring.  Also shown are FQIS 
minimum observed arc/spark levels with different excitation and induced 
faults. 
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper described the RF coupling measurements from 
PEDs in the passenger cabin of a large transport aircraft to its 
fuel tank and wiring.  Laboratory simulations were also 
conducted to determine the power requirement for creating 
arcing/sparking events on the fuel tank wiring.  Comparison of 
the two data sets resulted in the safety margin. 
The FQIS wiring was determined to be the dominant 
coupling path for RF power into the fuel tank.  There was a 
minimum of 10 dB safety margin between the power level 
required for a spark/arc and the power available from 
transmitting PEDs, even with a 25 W PED source at 27 MHz.  
A spark/arc within the fuel tank would require in excess of 250 
watts from a single PED, or from multiple PEDs with 
frequencies and positions such that the effects are additive.  
This was assuming certain fault conditions existed on the 
wiring inside the fuel tank. 
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